Austin was educated at Shrewsbury School in , earning a scholarship in Classics, and went on to study Classics at Balliol College, Oxford in In , he received a First in Literae Humaniores Classics and Philosophy as well as the Gaisford Prize for Greek prose and first class honours in his finals. Literae Humaniores introduced him to serious philosophy and gave him a lifelong interest in Aristotle. His more contemporary influences included especially G. Moore , John Cook Wilson and H. The contemporary influences shaped their views about general philosophical questions on the basis of careful attention to the more specific judgements we make.
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Austin was educated at Shrewsbury School in , earning a scholarship in Classics, and went on to study Classics at Balliol College, Oxford in In , he received a First in Literae Humaniores Classics and Philosophy as well as the Gaisford Prize for Greek prose and first class honours in his finals.
Literae Humaniores introduced him to serious philosophy and gave him a lifelong interest in Aristotle. His more contemporary influences included especially G.
Moore , John Cook Wilson and H. The contemporary influences shaped their views about general philosophical questions on the basis of careful attention to the more specific judgements we make. They took our specific judgements to be more secure than more general judgements. It has been said of him that, "he more than anybody was responsible for the life-saving accuracy of the D-Day intelligence" reported in Warnock 9.
Austin left the army with the rank of lieutenant colonel and was honored for his intelligence work with an OBE Officer of the Order of the British Empire , the French Croix de guerre , and the U.
Officer of the Legion of Merit. Austin died, shortly after being diagnosed with lung cancer, at the age of In contrast to the positivist view, he argues, sentences with truth-values form only a small part of the range of utterances. After introducing several kinds of sentences which he asserts are neither true nor false, he turns in particular to one of these kinds of sentences, which he calls performative utterances or just "performatives".
These he characterises by two features: Again, though they may take the form of a typical indicative sentence, performative sentences are not used to describe or "constate" and are thus not true or false; they have no truth-value. Second, to utter one of these sentences in appropriate circumstances is not just to "say" something, but rather to perform a certain kind of action.
For example, if you say "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth," and the circumstances are appropriate in certain ways, then you will have done something special, namely, you will have performed the act of naming the ship. Other examples include: "I take this man as my lawfully wedded husband," used in the course of a marriage ceremony, or "I bequeath this watch to my brother," as occurring in a will. After numerous attempts to find more characteristics of performatives, and after having met with many difficulties, Austin makes what he calls a "fresh start", in which he considers "more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something".
John has produced a series of bodily movements which result in the production of a certain sound. Austin called such a performance a phonetic act, and called the act a phone.
Austin called this a phatic act, and labels such utterances phemes. To use a pheme with a more or less definite sense and reference is to utter a rheme , and to perform a rhetic act. Note that rhemes are a sub-class of phemes, which in turn are a sub-class of phones. One cannot perform a rheme without also performing a pheme and a phone. The performance of these three acts is the performance of a locution—it is the act of saying something.
John has therefore performed a locutionary act. He has also done at least two other things. He has asked a question, and he has elicited an answer from Sue. Asking a question is an example of what Austin called an illocutionary act. Other examples would be making an assertion, giving an order, and promising to do something. To perform an illocutionary act is to use a locution with a certain force. It is an act performed in saying something, in contrast with a locution, the act of saying something.
Eliciting an answer is an example of what Austin calls a perlocutionary act , an act performed by saying something. Notice that if one successfully performs a perlocution, one also succeeds in performing both an illocution and a locution.
In the theory of speech acts, attention has especially focused on the illocutionary act, much less on the locutionary and perlocutionary act, and only rarely on the subdivision of the locution into phone, pheme and rheme.
Austin, " performative utterance " refers to a not truth-valuable action of "performing", or "doing" a certain action. For example, when people say "I promise to do so and so", they are generating the action of making a promise. In this case, without any flaw the promise is flawlessly fulfilled , the "performative utterance" is "happy", or to use J.
Notice that performative utterance is not truth-valuable, which means nothing said can be judged based on truth or falsity. There are four types of performative s according to Austin: explicit, implicit, primitive, and in explicit. In this book, Austin offers examples for each type of performative mentioned above. For explicit performative, he mentioned "I apologize", "I criticize" Page 83 , which are so explicit to receivers that it would not make sense for someone to ask "Does he really mean that?
In explicit performative are opposite, so the receiver will have understandable doubts. For primary performative, the example Austin gave is "I shall be there". Compared with explicit performative, there is uncertainty in implicit performative.
People might ask if he or she is promising to be there with primary performative, however, this uncertainty is not strong enough as in explicit performative. Most examples given are explicit because it is easy to identify and observe, and identifying other performative requires comparison and contrast with explicit performative. He states that perceptual variation, which can be attributed to physical causes, does not involve a figurative disconnect between sense and reference, due to an unreasonable separation of parts from the perceived object.
Austin argues that Ayer fails to understand the proper function of such words as "illusion", "delusion", "hallucination", "looks", "appears" and "seems", and uses them instead in a "special way By observing that it is i a substantive-hungry word that is sometimes a ii adjuster-word,  as well as a iii dimension-word  and iv a word whose negative use "wears the trousers,"  Austin highlights its complexities.
Only by doing so, according to Austin, can we avoid introducing false dichotomies. Urmson and Geoffrey Warnock. The book originally contained ten papers, two more being added in the second edition and one in the third. His paper Excuses has had a massive impact on criminal law theory.
Chapters 1 and 3 study how a word may have different, but related, senses. Chapters 2 and 4 discuss the nature of knowledge, focusing on performative utterance.
Chapters 5 and 6 study the correspondence theory , where a statement is true when it corresponds to a fact. Chapters 6 and 10 concern the doctrine of speech acts. Chapters 8, 9, and 12 reflect on the problems that language encounters in discussing actions and considering the cases of excuses, accusations, and freedom. The question set dealing with the existence of a priori concepts is treated only indirectly, by dismissing the concept of concept that underpins it. The first part of this paper takes the form of a reply to an argument for the existence of Universals : from observing that we do use words such as "grey" or "circular" and that we use a single term in each case, it follows that there must be a something that is named by such terms—a universal.
Furthermore, since each case of "grey" or "circular" is different, it follows that universals themselves cannot be sensed. Austin carefully dismantles this argument, and in the process other transcendental arguments. He points out first that universals are not "something we stumble across", and that they are defined by their relation to particulars. He continues by pointing out that, from the observation that we use "grey" and "circular" as if they were the names of things, it simply does not follow that there is something that is named.
In the process he dismisses the notion that "words are essentially proper names", asking " In the second part of the article, he generalizes this argument against universals to address concepts as a whole. He points out that it is "facile" to treat concepts as if they were "an article of property". Such questions as "Do we possess such-and-such a concept" and "how do we come to possess such-and-such a concept" are meaningless, because concepts are not the sort of thing that one possesses.
In the final part of the paper, Austin further extends the discussion to relations, presenting a series of arguments to reject the idea that there is some thing that is a relation. His argument likely follows from the conjecture of his colleague, S.
Tezlaf, who questioned what makes "this" "that". Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. Although Austin agrees with 2 , quipping that "we should be in a pretty predicament if I did", he found 1 to be false and 3 to be therefore unnecessary. The background assumption to 1 , Austin claims, is that if I say that I know X and later find out that X is false, I did not know it. Austin believes that this is not consistent with the way we actually use language.
He claims that if I was in a position where I would normally say that I know X, if X should turn out to be false, I would be speechless rather than self-corrective. He gives an argument that this is so by suggesting that believing is to knowing as intending is to promising— knowing and promising are the speech-act versions of believing and intending respectively.
Although their uses are similar, Austin argues that with the right examples we can see that a distinction exists in when one or the other phrase is appropriate.
Austin proposes some curious philosophical tools. For instance, he uses a sort of word game for developing an understanding of a key concept. This involves taking up a dictionary and finding a selection of terms relating to the key concept, then looking up each of the words in the explanation of their meaning.
This process is iterated until the list of words begins to repeat, closing in a "family circle" of words relating to the key concept. Philosophical Papers, p. Transcribed into hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, 23 August Statements are made, words or sentences are used. It is a new word and an ugly word, and perhaps it does not mean anything very much. But at any rate there is one thing in its favor, it is not a profound word.
During a lecture at Columbia University attended by American philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser , Austin made the claim that although a double negative in English implies a positive meaning, there is no language in which a double positive implies a negative. To which Morgenbesser responded in a dismissive tone, "Yeah, yeah. Philosophical Papers, , , , eds. Urmson and G.
Warnock , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
J. L. Austin
Principale rappresentante della filosofia del linguaggio ordinario, durante la seconda guerra mondiale presta servizio come tenente colonnello nei servizi segreti britannici. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Enunciato constativo ed Enunciato performativo. In un primo tempo, propone la distinzione fra enunciati constativi o costatativo ed enunciati performativi. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Teoria degli atti linguistici , Locuzione , Illocuzione e Perlocuzione. Attraverso una riflessione ulteriore sui tipi di enunciati, Austin supera e abbandona la sua stessa concezione. La forza illocutoria ha un carattere convenzionale: i metodi attraverso la quale viene espressa saranno infatti oggetto dello studio di filosofi successivi. Si pensi al caso di chi dice "Freschino qui dentro!
John Langshaw Austin: biografía de este filósofo
John Langshaw Austin