Upon expiry of T, in cases a, b and c, the UE shall locally release the established NAS signalling connection; or in cases d and e, the UE shall locally release the established NAS signalling connection and the UE shall initiate the attach procedure as described in subclause 5. In cases b and c, upon an indication from the lower layers that the user plane radio bearers are set up, the UE shall stop timer T and may send uplink signalling via the existing NAS signalling connection or user data via the user plane bearers. In case b, upon receiving a request from upper layers to send NAS signalling not associated with establishing either a CS emergency call or a PDN connection for emergency bearer services, the UE shall wait for the timer T to expire or be stopped before proceeding; or upon receiving a request from upper layers to establish either a CS emergency call or a PDN connection for emergency bearer services, the UE shall stop timer T and shall locally release the NAS signalling connection, before proceeding as specified in subclause 5. In cases d and e, upon an indication from the lower layers that the RRC connection has been released, the UE shall stop timer T and perform a new attach procedure as specified in subclause 5. If the UE has only one PDN connection established which is for emergency bearer services, the tracking areas shall not be removed from these lists if one or more tracking areas in the lists are received from the network. Each list shall accommodate 40 or more TAIs.
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Shaktitaxe This will also ensure that legacy 3vpp and applications continue to work with no impact. If no response is received, paging is repeated in the entire TA. We recommend further that each such exception should also trigger an analysis of its implications.
Therefore we made an effort to responsibly disclose our work to the relevant standard bodies and affected parties. Next, we discuss protection against DoS stemming from bidding down attacks D3. Many of the common applications 3hpp IP version agnostic and hence would work using an IPv6 bearer. To the best of our knowledge, our work 3gpo the first publicly reported practical attacks against LTE access network protocols. The same also applies the modem part of the UE does not have exact knowledge of whether the UE operating system IP stack is dual-stack capable or not.
Prime Rapporteur has been changed to Gabor Ungvari. Even though we utilized USRP B which costs around one thousand euros, passive attacks can also be realized practically with more cheaply available radio hardware. Roaming was briefly touched upon in Sections 8. Generally, machines, nowadays, are equipped with computing processors and software to accommodate us with more intelligence-based services.
The LTE suite of specifications is considered to be significantly better than its predecessors not only in terms of functionality but also with respect to security and privacy for subscribers.
Normally when a message is received from a Facebook friend, it will be in the normal inbox folder of that user. However, emergency calls are not possible when UE is attached to a rogue eNodeB. Stage 3 SAE impact on existing capabilities. The following options for disabling IPv6 access for roaming subscribers could be g3pp in some network deployments: Every dual-stack bearer still needs to be given an IPv4 address, private or public. Legacy devices and hosts that have an IPv4-only stack will continue to be provided with IP connectivity to the Internet and services.
A passive adversary is able to silently sniff LTE over-the-air radio broadcast channels. Are you sure you want delete specification? In contrast, our DoS attacks are persistent and targeted towards the UE subscribers.
History Action date Action Author. ESM message container Under change control Type: We will later make use of all of these aspects in developing our attacks. By the end of the worldwide LTE subscriber base is expected to be around 1. Further embodiments of the invention are claimed in the dependent claims. One of the national hs to whom we reported our findings, acknowledged the feasibility of our and already configured their networks to prevent tracking based on GUTIs. We recommend that safety margins introduced into future specifications to address such trade-offs should incorporate greater agility to accommodate subsequent changes in the trade-off equilibrium.
The observed GUTIs undergo a set intersection analysis where we apply the method proposed by Kune et. In this section, we show how the approximate location of an LTE subscriber inside an urban area can be inferred by applying a set of novel passive, tts, and active attacks. Mobile communication systems are now an essential part of life throughout the world. A device that may be roaming in a network wherein IPv6 is not supported by the visited network could fall rs to using IPv4 PDP contexts, and hence the end user would at least get some 3gpp.
We present several countermeasures to resist our specific attacks. We recommend that future standardization efforts take this into account. To apply the matching history principle to all parameters would have required the inclusion of a cryptographic hash of all the parameters, instead of the parameters themselves.
Our reports were acknowledged by all vendors and network operators we contacted. Running dual-stack networks requires the management of multiple IP address spaces. Software and hardware used in major telecommunication systems have traditionally been proprietary closed source and expensive. Using passive attack setup, we sniff these priorities and configure our eNodeB accordingly. There is little that can be done about this in the GGSN, assuming the neighbor-discovery implementation already does the right thing.
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